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Abstract
Refugee protection decisions engage migrants’ fundamental 
life, liberty, and security of the person interests. As a result, 
refugee protection claimants enjoy institutional and pro-
cedural rights under conventional international law. Th ese 
include the right to a fair adjudication of their protection 
claims by an independent tribunal. To be independent, a 
tribunal must meet the formal guarantees of security of 
tenure, fi nancial security, and administrative independ-
ence and must actually be independent, in appearance and 
practice, from the executive and legislature, particularly in 
the appointments process. Refugee protection decisions must 
be made by fi rst instance adjudicative bodies that either 
fully comply with the requirements of tribunal independ-
ence or whose decisions are subject to subsequent review by 
a tribunal that meets these requirements and has suffi  cient 
jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute. Th e Canadian 
refugee protection system fails, in certain respects, to meet 
international standards of independence. Th e Canadian 
Immigration and Refugee Board’s Refugee Protection 
Division enjoys statutory, objective badges of independ-
ence and appears to operate independently of the executive. 
However, the independence of Canadian offi  cials engaged 
in eligibility determinations and in pre-removal risk assess-
ments is very much in question because they have a closer 
relationship to executive law enforcement functions.
Résumé
Les décisions sur la protection des réfugiés ont un impact sur 
les intérêts fondamentaux des migrants ayant trait à leur vie, 
leur liberté et la sécurité de leur personne. Par conséquent, 
les demandeurs du statut de réfugié bénéfi cient de droits de 
nature institutionnelle ainsi que de droits procéduraux en 
droit international classique. Cela comprend le droit à une 
décision impartiale sur leurs demandes de protection par 
un tribunal indépendant. Pour être indépendant, un tribu-
nal doit satisfaire aux garanties formelles d’inamovibilité, 
de sécurité fi nancière et d’indépendance administrative, et 
doit eff ectivement être indépendant aussi bien en apparence 
que dans la pratique, des organes exécutifs et législatifs, tout 
particulièrement en ce qu’il s’agit du processus pour les no-
minations. Les décisions sur la protection des réfugiés doi-
vent être rendues par des organismes d’arbitrage de première 
instance qui soit, satisfaient pleinement aux conditions d’in-
dépendance de tribunal, ou dont les décisions sont sujettes 
à la révision ultérieure par un tribunal qui satisfait à ces 
conditions et qui possède suffi  samment de juridiction sur le 
fond du diff érend. Le système canadien de protection des 
réfugiés ne satisfait pas, à certains égards, aux normes in-
ternationales en matière d’indépendance. La Section de la 
protection des réfugiés de la Commission de l’immigration 
et du statut de réfugié du Canada jouit de symboles objectifs 
d’indépendance statutaire et semble opérer indépendam-
ment de l’organe exécutif. Cependant des doutes graves pla-
nent sur l’indépendance des fonctionnaires canadiens qui 
s’occupent de détermination de la recevabilité et d’examen 
des risques avant renvoi, car ils ont un lien plus rapproché 
avec des fonctions exécutives d’application des lois.
Introduction
In 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada determined that 
Canada’s refugee determination system violated the constitu-
tional right of refugee protection claimants to security of the 
person because refugee protection claims could be denied 
without giving claimants an in-person hearing or disclosure 
of crucial country conditions information relied upon by the 
decision makers.1 Th e Singh decision was a watershed mo-
ment in the development of Canada’s refugee determination 
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system. Th e Canadian government’s response was to cre-
ate an independent agency—the Immigration and Refugee 
Board (IRB)—to hear, in person and at fi rst instance, the 
claims of all eligible refugee protection claimants. Th ough a 
signifi cant measure of refugee protection responsibility has 
been entrusted to public servants in Canada’s Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration (CIC) under the current im-
migration and refugee protection law, the Refugee Protection 
Division (RPD) of the IRB remains a central, defi ning, and 
distinctive feature of Canada’s refugee status determination 
system.
Th ere is some evidence that the Canadian government 
may be rethinking the role of, or need for, an independent 
fi rst instance refugee protection tribunal. In 2003, under the 
previous Liberal administration, then Immigration Minister 
Denis Coderre publicly proposed removing initial decision-
making authority over refugee claims from the IRB and 
conferring it on CIC offi  cials.2 More recently, the minority 
Conservative government’s failure to replace, in a timely 
manner, IRB members whose appointments had expired led 
to a 33 per cent vacancy rate on the Board and a soaring back-
log of refugee claims. Opposition Members of Parliament 
charged that the government was seeking to manufacture a 
crisis in Canada’s refugee determination system in order to 
scrap the IRB and replace it with a less generous system of 
protection.3
I argue that no changes to the current refugee determina-
tion system that would diminish the role of independent agen-
cies in favour of the increased involvement of government 
offi  cials should be adopted without assessing and ensuring 
their conformity with international norms of independence. 
Th ere are three parts to this article. In the fi rst, I describe the 
scope and content of the right at international law to a fair 
hearing before an independent tribunal, as defi ned in article 
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)4 and article 6 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR).5 In the second part, I briefl y describe the decision-
making structure of Canada’s refugee determination system, 
and in the fi nal part, I assess the extent to which this system 
diverges from international norms of tribunal independ-
ence. I conclude that Canada’s refugee determination system 
in its current form does not guarantee all refugee protection 
claimants that to which they are entitled under international 
law: a hearing before an independent tribunal with suffi  cient 
jurisdiction over the merits of their claims.
Th e Guarantee of Independence in Conventional 
International Law
International human rights law entitles each individual to 
a fair and public hearing by an independent and impar-
tial tribunal in the determination of his or her rights and 
obligations. Th is right is expressly guaranteed in several 
international declarations and conventions, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,6 the ICCPR, the 
ECHR, and the American Convention on Human Rights.7 It 
has been observed, based on a wide-ranging review of state 
constitutions, legislation, and supporting state practice re-
garding judicial independence, that “the general practice of 
providing independent and impartial justice is accepted by 
states as a matter of law” and is thus a customary norm of 
international law.8 Th is part focuses on how the scope and 
content of the norm of tribunal independence are defi ned 
under article 14(1) ICCPR and article 6(1) ECHR.
Ratifi ed by Canada and in force since 1976, the ICCPR’s 
provisions are binding on Canada under international law, 
which means that at the very least, Canadian courts should, 
where possible, interpret Canadian law in a manner that 
comports with Canada’s obligations under the Covenant.9 
Moreover, Canada has claimed in its regular reports to the 
UN Human Rights Committee to have implemented the 
terms of the Covenant by, among other measures, enacting 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.10 Th e Human Rights 
Committee, established under the Covenant, monitors the 
implementation of the Covenant by reviewing the periodic 
reports of states parties and issues commentaries on the 
meaning and scope of the Covenant’s provisions. Canada has 
recognized the jurisdiction of the Committee to receive and 
consider communications from individuals alleging a breach 
by Canada of their rights under the Covenant.11 I pay close 
attention to the Committee’s pronouncements on the scope 
and content of the norm of tribunal independence expressed 
in article 14, and also consider the jurisprudence of the 
European Court regarding the norm of tribunal independ-
ence expressed in article 6 ECHR, a provision broadly analo-
gous to article 14 ICCPR, which off ers insight into the nature 
and extent of Canada’s international obligations.
Scope of the Right to an Independent Tribunal
Does article 14(1) guarantee the right to a hearing before an 
independent tribunal in the context of refugee status deter-
mination? In 2007, the Human Rights Committee expressed 
the view that “proceedings relating to an alien’s expulsion” do 
not fall within article 14(1),12 a decision consistent with the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights in respect of 
article 6(1).13 I claim that these decisions by the Committee 
and the European Court should not extend to refugee status 
determinations because they are inconsistent with the pur-
pose and draft ing history of articles 14(1) ICCPR and 6(1) 
ECHR and with the general framework governing the appli-
cation of these provisions to adjudications in the public law 
realm.
Volume 25 Refuge Number 2
80
Refuge25-2.indd   80 5/25/10   5:51:37 PM
Th e right to an independent tribunal in public law adjudi-
cations
Article 14(1) of the ICCPR
Article 14(1) ICCPR provides that:
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In 
the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his 
rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled 
to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.
Th e right of persons to “a fair and public hearing by a com-
petent, independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law” applies only to the determination of a criminal charge 
and to the determination of a person’s “rights and obligations 
in a suit at law”. Th e travaux préparatoires to the Covenant 
and the Committee’s views and comments indicate that 
some proceedings of an administrative nature are captured 
by article 14(1) and subject to its requirements of fairness, 
independence, and impartiality.14
Th e travaux préparatoires reveal a debate among draft ing 
committee delegates about whether the right to a fair hear-
ing before an independent tribunal in non-criminal matters 
should be restricted to proceedings that determined “civil” or 
“private” rights and obligations or extended to proceedings 
between individuals and the state, including administrative 
matters.15 Th e compromise accepted by the committee was 
to remove the adjective “civil” but qualify the term “rights 
and obligations” with the phrase “in a suit at law,” a formu-
lation intended to emphasize that “appealing to a tribunal 
was an act of a judicial nature.”16 Th e consensus among the 
draft ers was to extend article 14(1) protections to disputes 
between individuals and the state.17 However, the term “in 
a suit at law” was intended to remove some matters from the 
scope of article 14(1), like “administrative proceedings in the 
fi rst instance as to subject matters unrelated to human-rights 
concerns, such as taxation.”18
Th e Human Rights Committee appeared to confi rm that 
article 14(1) applies to administrative proceedings in Y.L. v. 
Canada.19 Th e author of the communication, a soldier dis-
charged from the armed forces, unsuccessfully applied to the 
Canadian Pension Commission for a disability pension. He 
appealed to the Pension Review Board, which confi rmed the 
Commission’s rulings. He claimed that he had been denied a 
fair and public hearing in violation of article 14(1). Canada 
replied that the communication was inadmissible because 
Pension Review Board proceedings were not a “suit at law”: 
the relationship between the author, a member of the armed 
forces, and the state was a matter of public law, and did not 
concern “civil rights and obligations,” an expression taken 
from the French-language version of article 14(1), which re-
fers to “contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractère 
civil.” Th e Human Rights Committee held that:
… the concept of a “suit at law” or its equivalent in the other lan-
guage texts is based on the nature of the right in question rather 
than on the status of one of the parties (governmental, para-
statal or autonomous statutory entities), or else on the particular 
forum in which individual legal systems may provide that the 
right in question is to be adjudicated upon, especially in com-
mon law systems where there is no inherent diff erence between 
public law and private law and where the courts normally exer-
cise control over the proceedings either at fi rst instance or on 
appeal specifi cally provided by statute or else by way of judicial 
review. In this regard, each communication must be examined 
in light of its particular features.20
In relation to the author’s pension claim, the Committee 
noted that it was clear “that the Canadian legal system sub-
jects the proceedings in [the various administrative bod-
ies before which the author pursued his claim] to judicial 
supervision and control, because the Federal Court Act does 
provide the possibility of judicial review in unsuccessful 
claims of this nature.”21 Th e fi rst instance hearing before the 
Pension Review Board, coupled with the availability of judi-
cial review of the Board’s decision, appeared to comply with 
article 14(1).22
Although the Committee did not expressly state that the 
pension proceeding was a suit at law, this can be implied from 
its views,23 and many academic commentators have conclud-
ed that the Committee recognized that the Pension Board 
proceedings concerned the determination of rights and obli-
gations in a suit at law.24 Th e Committee has since held that 
article 14(1) applies to proceedings involving governments 
as parties, including wrongful dismissal proceedings brought 
by civil servants against their state employers25 and to child 
protection proceedings under child welfare legislation.26 In 
contrast, the selection and appointment of judges by Cyprus’s 
Supreme Council of Judicature did not determine rights and 
obligations in a suit at law because they concerned the denial 
of an application for employment in the judiciary by a body 
exercising a “non-judicial” task.27
Like the travaux préparatoires, which suggest that the 
phrase “suit at law” was added to emphasize that proceedings 
subject to article 14(1) would be of a “judicial” nature, the 
Committee’s allusion to “non-judicial” and “judicial” tasks is 
reminiscent of the eff orts of Canadian courts to determine the 
threshold for the application of the common law duty of pro-
cedural fairness, and in particular their distinction between 
administrative decisions and judicial decisions.28 Drawing 
on this analogy, the Committee’s focus on whether the im-
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pugned decision is of a judicial nature can be reconciled with 
its decision in Y.L., where the Committee was essentially pre-
occupied with the following question: was the author’s claim 
the kind of claim over which courts would normally exercise 
control and supervision to ensure it was decided fairly? In 
Kazantzis, it found that the author’s application for a judicial 
appointment did not entail decision making of a “judicial” 
nature. Courts would not normally recognize that the author 
was owed a duty of fairness for the determination of this kind 
of claim, and would not enforce such a duty. Th erefore, under 
the Y.L. test, claims of this nature were not within the scope 
of article 14(1). Under this approach, to ask whether article 
14(1) applies to the determination of an individual’s claim 
is to ask whether a duty of fairness is owed to the claimant. 
Under the Y.L. test, as at common law, the answer to that 
question depends on the nature of the claim.29 If the deter-
minations required to reach a decision on the author’s claim 
are closer to judicial than legislative decision making and if 
that decision signifi cantly impacts the author’s life, the claim 
is of a kind normally subject to judicial supervision and con-
trol to ensure its fair determination; the Y.L. test is satisfi ed 
and article 14(1) applies. If this reasoning is correct, there 
should be no doubt that article 14 applies to refugee status 
determinations and refugee protection decisions which have 
long attracted the application of the duty of procedural fair-
ness. Before examining this question in greater detail, it is 
instructive to review the rules governing the application of 
article 6(1) ECHR to public law proceedings.
Article 6(1) of the ECHR
Article 6(1) states:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.
Th e extent to which article 6(1) applies to public law disputes 
is also a contentious question. Th e European Court has ap-
plied article 6(1) outside the criminal context where the im-
pugned proceedings involve a dispute (“contestation”) over a 
“right,” the impugned proceedings lead to a “determination” 
of the right, and the right is of a “civil” nature.
Th e Court must fi rst decide whether there is a dispute over 
a “right” which can be said on arguable grounds to be recog-
nized under domestic law. Th e concepts of “right” and “obli-
gation” have an autonomous meaning under the European 
Convention and the European Court is not bound by a state’s 
determination of whether the national legal system classifi es 
an interest or privilege as a “right.”30 An entitlement or right 
expressly provided for by statute is clearly “recognized under 
domestic law”. A right may also be found to exist in the face 
of a broad statutory discretion to confer a benefi t or issue a 
license, even where the applicant cannot claim entitlement to 
a specifi c outcome.31 Th e Court has held that the “contesta-
tion” must be of a genuine and serious nature; may relate to 
the actual existence of a right, to its scope, or to the manner 
in which the right may be exercised; and may concern ques-
tions of both fact and law.32 Th e impugned proceedings must 
lead to a “determination” of the civil right or obligation: they 
must be “decisive for,” “aff ect,” or “relate to” the determina-
tion or exercise of a “civil” right.33 Finally, the entitlement to 
a hearing by an independent tribunal is guaranteed in cases 
involving the determination of individuals’ “civil rights and 
obligations.” A major point of contention has been whether 
“civil” should be equated with “private,” and article 6(1) re-
stricted to proceedings meant to determine individual prop-
erty rights or rights arising in tort or contract law. As de-
scribed previously, there are strong arguments, based on the 
draft ing history of articles 14(1) ICCPR and 6(1) ECHR, that 
this was not the intention of the draft ers of either provision,34 
and that “civil” rights covers the determination of all legal 
rights outside the sphere of criminal law.35 Th e European 
Court recognizes that the concept of “civil right or obliga-
tion” has its own meaning in European Convention law, that 
it does not exclude disputes between individuals and the 
state acting in its sovereign capacity, and that the character 
of the legislation which governs the matter to be determined 
and the nature of the authority which has jurisdiction in the 
matter (ordinary court or administrative body) are of little 
consequence in determining whether a right or obligation is 
civil in character.36
Applying these principles on a case by case basis, the 
European Court has extended the scope of article 6(1) be-
yond disputes concerning private rights to proceedings with 
a strong “public” fl avour. Th e Court identifi ed a dispute in-
volving the determination of “civil rights” and thus governed 
by article 6(1) in each of the following cases: the withdrawal 
of a liquor permit (despite Sweden’s claim that regulating 
alcohol distribution and consumption was part of its social 
policy and fell within an essential fi eld of public law);37 the 
decisions of professional disciplinary tribunals to restrict or 
eliminate individuals’ right to exercise professions;38 dis-
putes regarding individuals’ entitlement to health insurance 
under social security legislation;39 and an individual’s claim 
of entitlement to welfare allowances.40
Th e right to an independent tribunal in the refugee status 
determination and protection context
Having reviewed the general framework for determining 
the applicability of articles 14(1) ICCPR and 6(1) ECHR, 
particularly in the public law context, I now turn to the ap-
Volume 25 Refuge Number 2
82
Refuge25-2.indd   82 5/25/10   5:51:38 PM
plication of these provisions in the migration context, and 
specifi cally to refugee status determinations. As noted ear-
lier, the Committee’s Y.L. decision essentially held that article 
14(1) applies to claims of a kind normally subject to judicial 
supervision and control. Refugee status determinations and 
refugee protection proceedings involve the application of 
legal criteria to a factual matrix particular to each individual 
claimant. Such determinations are specifi c and judicial in na-
ture and have a signifi cant impact on fundamental individual 
interests. Th e claims involved in such proceedings are thus 
clearly of a kind normally subject to judicial supervision and 
control and should on this basis attract article 14(1) guaran-
tees.
It also seems clear that under the European Court’s rela-
tively broad interpretation of article 6(1), the provision should 
apply to refugee status determination proceedings since they 
are determinative of refugee claimants’ civil rights. An indi-
vidual is a refugee as soon as she meets the criteria set out 
in the Refugee Convention.41 In practice, however, she may 
only exercise the rights and enjoy the benefi ts that attach to 
refugee status, described in the Refugee Convention, if her 
surrogate state recognizes her status, usually aft er a refugee 
status determination proceeding.42 In particular, Chapter II 
requires refugees’ “surrogate state” to recognize, among other 
rights, property and commercial rights and family law rights 
long recognized by the European Court as falling within the 
category of “civil law” rights for purposes of the application 
of article 6(1).43 Similarly, the guarantees set out in Chapter 
III regarding the rights of refugees to engage in wage-earning 
employment and, in particular, to practice a profession have 
also been accepted by the European Court as rights of a “civil 
law” nature.44 Chapter IV provides that the surrogate state 
must accord to refugees lawfully staying in its territory the 
same treatment as it accords its own nationals in respect of 
public relief and assistance45 and social security.46 Claims 
to such benefi ts have also been recognized by the European 
Court as falling within the scope of article 6(1). Since refu-
gees may exercise these rights or enjoy these benefi ts—many 
of which have “a civil law character”—only if the surrogate 
state recognizes their status, refugee status determination 
proceedings certainly “aff ect” or “are related to” and arguably 
are “directly decisive” for the question whether a civil law 
right can be exercised.47 Under the interpretive framework 
followed by the European Court in contexts other than mi-
gration, they fall squarely within the scope of article 6(1).
Nevertheless, in Maaouia v. France, where a Tunisian im-
migrant who was ordered deported aft er committing serious 
criminal off ences challenged the fairness of France’s depor-
tation procedures, the European Court held that decisions 
regarding the “entry, stay and deportation of aliens” do not 
concern the determination of their civil rights or obligations 
under article 6(1).48 Proceedings for the rescission of exclu-
sion orders did not concern the determination of aliens’ civil 
rights, even though exclusion orders signifi cantly aff ected 
their private and family life and prospects of employment.49 
Th e Court based its decision primarily on the Council of 
Europe’s adoption, twenty-four years aft er the ratifi cation 
of the European Convention, of a separate protocol provid-
ing minimal procedural administrative safeguards to aliens 
in expulsion proceedings. A majority of the Court accepted 
that the State Parties to the Convention had not intended im-
migration proceedings to be covered by article 6(1), and rea-
soned that the protocol was adopted precisely to fi ll the gap 
resulting from the lack of article 6(1) guarantees.50 Th ough 
Maaouia did not involve a challenge to refugee status deter-
mination proceedings and the Court did not pronounce it-
self on the application of article 6(1) to such proceedings, it 
has since asserted that Maaouia stands for the proposition 
that article 6(1) does not apply to “matters of asylum.”51
Dissenting in Maaouia, Judges Loucaides and Traja round-
ly criticized the majority judgment. First, they rejected its in-
terpretation of the concept of “civil rights” as unduly narrow 
and at odds with a purposive interpretation of treaties and the 
draft ing history of article 6(1).52 “Civil right” should be read 
to include all legal rights that were not of a criminal nature,53 
because this interpretation enhanced individual rights in line 
with the object of the European Convention.54 Further, it 
was inconceivable that a convention intended to implement 
the rule of law could provide for the fair administration of 
justice in respect of rights between individuals but fail to do 
so in respect of rights and obligations “vis-à-vis the admin-
istration where an independent judicial control is especially 
required for the protection of individuals against the power-
ful authorities of the State.”55 Second, the dissent questioned 
the majority’s reliance on the protocol, arguing that while its 
procedural protections for the expulsion of aliens were in-
tended to govern proceedings before competent administra-
tive authorities, they did not purport to restrict any judicial 
guarantees that aliens enjoyed under article 6(1), but instead 
supplemented these guarantees.56 Th e Council of Europe’s 
decision to require states to put in place an administrative 
authority governed by minimal procedural guarantees could 
not be taken, without express language, to restrict aliens’ 
right to a fair hearing under article 6(1). A protocol entered 
into long aft er the ratifi cation of the European Convention 
and meant to form part of the Convention could not qualify 
or abolish the human rights previously safeguarded in the 
main body of the Convention.57
Th e Maaouia dissent advances powerful reasons against 
excluding migration proceedings from the scope of article 
6(1) based on a narrow interpretation of the term “civil 
rights.” Refugee status determination proceedings, more-
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over, appear to fall within the scope of article 6(1) as defi ned 
by the European Court in contexts other than migration. 
Th e broad interpretation urged by the dissenting judges is 
even more compelling in the context of article 14(1) ICCPR, 
whose draft ers expressly dropped the adjective “civil” from 
the English-language version to include public law proceed-
ings within its scope,58 and is consistent with other regional 
human rights instruments which do not distinguish between 
“civil” and “public” law rights.59 Th e result in Maaouia is driv-
en less by the text of article 6(1) and the Court’s article 6(1) 
jurisprudence than by the implied eff ect of a specifi c proto-
col. And yet, the Human Rights Committee appears to have 
followed the European Court’s lead. In P.K. v. Canada,60 P.K. 
was denied refugee status by the IRB on grounds of credibil-
ity and denied leave to apply for judicial review of this deci-
sion by the Federal Court, and she unsuccessfully applied for 
a pre-removal risk assessment and for permanent residence 
on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Following her 
removal to Pakistan, she claimed a violation of article 14(1) 
because the risk assessments preceding her deportation were 
neither fair nor independent. Canada argued that P.K.’s claim 
was inadmissible because article 14(1) did not apply. Refugee 
determination proceedings were “public law” proceed-
ings, not a criminal charge or suit at law, and their fairness 
was guaranteed by article 13 ICCPR.61 Canada argued that 
articles 6(1) ECHR and 14(1) ICCPR were “equivalent,” that 
the European Court’s case law was “persuasive” and that the 
Committee should follow Maaouia.62 Th e Committee held 
that:
[T]he concept of a “suit at law” under article [14(1)] … is based 
on the nature of the right in question rather than on the status 
of one of the parties. In the present case, the proceedings relate 
to the author’s right to receive protection in the State party’s ter-
ritory. Th e Committee considers that proceedings relating to an 
alien’s expulsion, the guarantees in regard to which are governed 
by article 13 of the Covenant, do not also fall within the ambit 
of a determination of “rights and obligations in a suit at law”, 
within the meaning of article [14(1)]. It concludes that the de-
portation proceedings of the author do not fall within the scope 
of article [14(1)], and are inadmissible … 63
Th e Committee appears to have accepted that, by analogy 
to the role of the protocol in Maaouia, article 13 ICCPR is 
a complete code governing migration proceedings and, as 
such, excludes the application of the more general article 
14(1). Th is is not a plausible interpretation of article 14, for 
several reasons. First, article 13 applies only to decisions pur-
suant to which non-citizens lawfully present in a State Party 
are expelled.64 It does not apply to proceedings, like refugee 
determination proceedings, that do not of themselves lead 
to expulsion,65 but that are a necessary precondition to the 
exercise of non-citizens’ civil rights, as demonstrated above. 
A second reason to doubt that article 13 precludes the ap-
plication of article 14(1) to refugee protection proceedings 
is that article 13 applies to all non-citizens facing expulsion 
proceedings, including individuals present on a state’s ter-
ritory who have simply overstayed their visitor’s or student 
visa, and for whom expulsion may engage no signifi cant life, 
liberty, and security of the person interests. An interpretation 
of the Covenant that entitles refugee protection claimants, 
whose claims of well-founded fear of persecution in their 
home countries engage such interests, to procedural and in-
stitutional rights no higher than those enjoyed by overstayers 
must be rejected. Construing article 13 to preclude the appli-
cation of article 14(1) to refugee determination or expulsion 
proceedings is contrary to a purposive interpretation of these 
fundamental human rights. It is preferable to interpret article 
13 as requiring that the authority competent to order a non-
citizen’s expulsion at least off er that individual a procedurally 
fair administrative reconsideration of its expulsion decision. 
Th is requirement should not be taken, without express lan-
guage, to remove the state’s obligation to also provide for a 
fair hearing before an independent tribunal, either through a 
subsequent hearing before an administrative body or through 
judicial review.66 Maaouia and P.K. lack any reasoning that 
could justify exempting refugee status determinations from 
the general frameworks developed by the European Court 
and the Committee to determine the applicability of articles 
6(1) ECHR and 14(1) ICCPR. Protection claims, as well as 
claims regarding juridical status, the right to practice a pro-
fession, and the entitlement to social benefi ts which may 
fl ow from the recognition of refugee status in refugee status 
determination proceedings, are of a kind over which courts 
would normally exercise control and supervision to ensure 
they were decided fairly. Th ey should be governed by article 
14(1) ICCPR.
Content of the Right to an Independent Tribunal
Th e ICCPR
Article 14 ICCPR requires that determinations of rights and 
obligations in a suit at law be made by a competent, independ-
ent and impartial tribunal established by law. Administrative 
authorities, as well as national civil courts, are considered 
“tribunals” under article 14(1).67 In determining whether a 
tribunal is independent, the Committee considers “the man-
ner in which judges are appointed, the qualifi cations for ap-
pointment, and the duration of their terms of offi  ce; the con-
ditions governing their promotion, transfer and cessation of 
their functions; and the actual independence of the judiciary 
from the executive branch and the legislature.”68 Th ese cri-
teria were inspired by a United Nations initiative to defi ne 
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the minimum standards fl owing from the right to an in-
dependent tribunal guaranteed in the UDHR and ICCPR.69 
Th e United Nations’ “principal instrument” for defi ning ju-
dicial independence is a document titled “Basic Principles 
on the Independence of the Judiciary,”70 endorsed by the 
UN General Assembly.71 In parallel, the UN Commission 
on Human Rights’ Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities appointed a 
special rapporteur, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, to conduct an exhaust-
ive study of state constitutions, legislation, and supporting 
state practice and produce a report on the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary. In his seminal fi nal report and 
a follow-up report, Dr. Singhvi developed a Draft  Universal 
Declaration on the Independence of Justice.72 Th e Basic 
Principles and the Singhvi Declaration include the traditional 
guarantees of security of tenure, fi nancial security, and ad-
ministrative control recognized in Canadian jurisprudence 
on independence.73 In addition, both documents require 
that judges be appointed and promoted based on their in-
tegrity, training, and qualifi cations rather than improper 
motives.74 Dr. Singhvi notes that in relation to the principle 
of independence, the doctrine of separation of powers pos-
tulates, among other things, “the insulation of the judiciary 
in respect of appointment, promotion, posting, transfer, re-
moval, emoluments and other conditions of work and service 
from external and extraneous infl uence of legislative and the 
executive.”75
Th ough developed primarily in relation to the independ-
ence of the judiciary, these guarantees are relevant to the in-
dependence of administrative decision makers.76 Th e princi-
ple of independence applies to both judges and “others, who, 
without being judges in the formal sense, perform judicial 
roles and functions.”77 However, in its application to “admin-
istrators and policymakers” with adjudicative functions, the 
principle of independence “cannot be secured in the same 
way as in the case of judges and tribunals whose functions 
are primarily judicial and who belong by their appointment 
to the machinery of justice”:
Th e terms and tenures of those who are not a part of the judi-
ciary are necessarily diff erent; so are their background and ap-
pointment procedures. Safeguards applicable to members of the 
judiciary cannot, therefore, be made applicable to them. Th ey 
may nevertheless be called upon to discharge duties of a judi-
cial and quasi-judicial nature in an impartial and independent 
manner. ( … ) With regard to those who also perform judicial 
or quasi-judicial roles but who are [not] strictly a part of the 
judiciary, judicial standards and other safeguards apply as far as 
possible.78
In sum, the safeguards dictated by the principle of independ-
ence apply to the fullest extent to regular courts and to tri-
bunals exercising primarily judicial functions. In the case of 
administrators and policy makers who also have an adjudi-
cative function, they apply by analogy with suitable modi-
fi cations and “judicial” safeguards apply only as far as pos-
sible. Th e principle of independence remains relevant along 
the entire decision-making spectrum but requires stronger 
safeguards for decision makers whose functions more closely 
resemble those of courts.
Th e Committee has had occasion to elaborate on the re-
quirements of the article 14(1) guarantee of independence 
in its concluding remarks on the periodic reports of various 
state parties to the Covenant and in its views on individual 
communications. However, its interventions have largely 
been limited to cases of egregious interference by the execu-
tive with the appointment and tenure of judges,79 and article 
14(1) has seldom been applied in the context of administra-
tive decision making.
Th e ECHR
Article 6(1) ECHR guarantees individuals whose civil rights 
are to be determined a right of access to proceedings be-
fore tribunals, including administrative tribunals,80 whose 
organization and composition meet minimum standards 
of independence and impartiality. Independence requires 
that decision-making bodies be free to exercise their pow-
ers without interference from the state’s executive or legisla-
ture or from the parties to the dispute.81 While article 6 does 
not require states to comply with “theoretical constitutional 
concepts” regarding the separation of the judicial from the 
legislative or executive powers,82 these are increasingly rec-
ognized as an important foundation of the principle of in-
dependence.83
Th e principal guarantors of independence
In the seminal case of Campbell and Fell, the Court sought 
to determine whether a prison’s “Board of Visitors,” charged 
with supervising the administration of a prison and adjudi-
cating prisoners’ alleged violations of prison regulations, 
was independent. In determining whether a tribunal is in-
dependent, the Court held, three criteria were relevant: the 
manner of appointment of the tribunal’s members and their 
term of offi  ce, the existence of guarantees against outside 
pressure, and whether the tribunal presents an appearance 
of independence.
Th e manner of appointment of tribunal members and their 
term of offi  ce. Th e fact that tribunal members are appointed 
by the executive does not deprive them of independence. Th e 
executive can even provide tribunal members with guide-
lines regarding the performance of their functions without 
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imperiling their independence as long as it does not instruct 
them in their adjudicatory role.84 Th e Court has upheld 
the independence of specialized boards of expert civil ser-
vants who were statutorily and constitutionally required to 
discharge their duties independently and not be subject to 
instructions from the executive,85 and whose independence 
was strengthened by a fi ve-year term and virtual irremov-
ability guaranteed by law.86 In deciding whether decision 
makers’ terms of offi  ce are suffi  cient to guarantee independ-
ence, the Court has applied a fl exible, contextual standard.87
Th e existence of guarantees against outside pressure. Article 
6(1) guarantees the irremovability of judges during their term 
of offi  ce. In the absence of formal guarantees of independ-
ence, such as statutorily mandated security of tenure, the 
Court examines whether these guarantees are recognized 
in practice and whether others are present. It may regard a 
tribunal as independent provided its members are irremov-
able in practice.88 For example, the independence of a Court 
Martial was not compromised by the fact that its permanent 
president, appointed for a four-year term to serve on panels 
with an independent judge advocate and two serving offi  cers, 
did not enjoy formal security of tenure because permanent 
presidents enjoyed de facto security of tenure: they had never 
been removed from offi  ce, their position was the last of their 
careers, eliminating promotions concerns as a possible in-
fl uence, and they worked outside the chain of command.89 
Serving offi  cers, in contrast, were not independent. Th ese 
relatively junior offi  cers were appointed on an ad hoc basis for 
individual proceedings, had no legal training, and were not 
statutorily protected from external army infl uence while hear-
ing a case. Th ey were exposed to outside pressure that jeop-
ardized their independence. Th ey were members of the army, 
which was directed by the executive, and they were subject to 
military discipline and assessment reports that impacted their 
careers. Rules governing their selection, the requirement to 
swear an oath promising impartiality, the confi dentiality of 
deliberations, and the rule that junior members express their 
view on verdict and sentence fi rst were insuffi  cient guaran-
tees against outside pressure.90 However, the independence 
of junior members of a Court Martial could be assured with 
additional safeguards.91 One such safeguard was the provision 
of training material that explained Court Martial procedures 
and the role of each decision maker in the proceedings, and 
that instructed them of “the need to function independently 
of outside or inappropriate infl uence or instruction and of the 
importance of this being seen to be done,” providing “prac-
tical and precise indications of how this could be achieved 
or undermined in a particular situation.”92 Such instructions 
brought home to the members the “vital importance of in-
dependence” and provided a “signifi cant impediment to any 
inappropriate pressure being brought to bear.”93 Another im-
portant safeguard was that any opinion expressed or vote cast 
by offi  cers during court martial proceedings remained confi -
dential, preventing superiors from subjecting their perform-
ance to assessment reports.94
Whether the tribunal presents an appearance of independ-
ence. Th is third criterion operates in cases where the deci-
sion makers meet the traditional guarantees of independ-
ence but perform overlapping adjudicative and prosecutorial 
functions or, on a case-specifi c basis, are subject to executive 
interference. For example, a penitentiary’s Board of Visitors 
could still be viewed as independent despite its dual role in 
supervising prison administration and adjudicating inmates’ 
violations of prison rules, which placed it in frequent contact 
with prison offi  cials and inmates.95 In contrast, a minister’s 
rarely used power to revoke a planning inspector’s authority 
to decide an appeal deprived the inspector of the requisite 
appearance of independence.96
Judicial review and independence
Article 6(1) ECHR does not guarantee parties the opportun-
ity to directly submit disputes over civil rights to independent 
tribunals. For reasons of fl exibility and effi  ciency, a decision-
making process may employ, at fi rst instance, decision mak-
ers that do not satisfy the article 6(1) requirements in every 
respect.97 It will comply with article 6(1) as long as a tribunal 
meeting these requirements eventually reviews the dispute.98 
Th is “composite approach”99 was fi rst adopted in Albert and 
Le Compte, which involved a professional discipline tribu-
nal’s decision to suspend the applicant doctors from medical 
practice:
… [T]he Convention calls at least for one of the two following 
systems: either the jurisdictional organs themselves comply with 
the requirements of Article 6(1), or they do not so comply but 
are subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full 
jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6(1).100
But what did “full jurisdiction” mean? Where professional 
discipline adjudications involved two decision-making bod-
ies, one of which made fi nal and binding fi ndings of fact and 
the other fi nal and binding fi ndings of law, the Court held 
that each body was required to meet the requirements of 
article 6(1).101 In a series of cases from the United Kingdom, 
the European Court determined that judicial review of local 
authorities’ child access orders did not comply with article 
6(1).102 Each case was brought by natural parents contesting 
the decision of a local authority to restrict their access to a 
child in the authority’s care as an infringement of their right 
to private and family life under article 8 ECHR. Th e Court 
observed that the composite approach required that parents 
“have the local authority’s decision reviewed by a tribunal 
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having jurisdiction to examine the merits of the matter.”103 
Judicial review before the English courts was insuffi  cient be-
cause it was “concerned with reviewing not the merits of the 
decision in question but rather the decision making process 
itself.”104
In some decision-making contexts, the European Court 
has relaxed the requirements of its composite approach to 
the guarantee of tribunal independence.105 Courts reviewing 
a fi rst-instance decision that does not comply with article 
6(1), perhaps because the decision maker is not independ-
ent, no longer need “full” jurisdiction over the claim; they 
just need “enough” jurisdiction to deal with the grounds of 
review point by point. In Bryan v. U.K., the European Court 
held that whether a reviewing court has “enough” jurisdic-
tion depends on the manner in which the fi rst-instance deci-
sion was arrived at, the content of the dispute including the 
grounds of review and the subject matter of the decision.106 
Th e fi rst two factors are usually considered together. Th us, 
if the dispute is over a policy question, the initial decision 
could be made by a decision maker lacking independence as 
long as Wednesbury-like review is available.107 If the dispute 
concerns fi ndings of fact, such limited judicial review is suf-
fi cient only if the initial decision is taken in a quasi-judicial 
process (i.e., a hearing) by a decision maker bearing some of 
the badges of independence.108 Th e third factor, the subject 
matter of the decision under review, is crucial. Proceedings 
that involve fundamental rights or interests demand more 
safeguards at fi rst instance and more intensive review. Th ese 
include child access proceedings, for which Wednesbury rea-
sonableness review was, according to the European Court, 
insuffi  cient to satisfy article 6(1). Th e House of Lords has held 
that article 6(1) requires the highest standards of independ-
ence for decisions touching on basic rights such as liberty 
rights engaged by the criminal process, “private” rights, and 
rights protected by the European Convention, including the 
right to a private and family life.109
In sum, conventional international law generally entitles 
individuals to have their rights and obligations adjudicated 
by an independent tribunal. Under the ECHR and ICCPR, 
the right to an independent tribunal is limited to the deter-
mination of “civil” rights and obligations or of rights and 
obligations “in a suit at law.” However, the Human Rights 
Committee, other UN bodies, and the European Court have 
interpreted the right to an independent tribunal purposively, 
and have recognized its application to decision making by 
administrative tribunals in public law contexts ranging from 
town planning and economic regulation to social assistance 
and human rights protection. While they have recognized 
the importance of formal guarantees of security of tenure, fi -
nancial security, and administrative independence to ensure 
tribunal independence, they also emphasize the need to en-
sure that tribunals are “actually” independent, in appearance 
and practice, from the executive branch and the legislature, 
particularly in the appointments process. States may design 
decision-making schemes involving adjudicative bodies that 
do not fully comply with the requirements of tribunal in-
dependence, so long as their decisions are subject to subse-
quent review by a tribunal that meets these requirements and 
has suffi  cient jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute. It is 
diffi  cult to pinpoint precisely what degree of jurisdiction over 
the merits is “suffi  cient” for judicial review of administrative 
decision making to satisfy the international norm of tribunal 
independence since, as demonstrated by the foregoing review 
of the European Court’s jurisprudence, the meaning of these 
concepts is continuously evolving. However, disputes involv-
ing fundamental human rights adjudicated at fi rst instance 
by non-independent decision makers will require more in-
tense review by independent tribunals with jurisdiction over 
questions of fact and law. Before applying these principles to 
the design of Canada’s refugee status determination system, I 
briefl y describe this system in the following section.
Canada’s Refugee Protection System
Canada off ers protection to persons who meet the 
Convention refugee defi nition110 and to “persons in need of 
protection,” whose removal from Canada to their country of 
origin would subject them personally to a danger of torture, 
a risk to their life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment.111
Eligibility
A person arriving at a Canadian port of entry may make a 
refugee protection claim to an offi  cer employed by the Canada 
Border Services Agency (CBSA), an agency reporting to the 
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.112 
Persons already in Canada may make a claim to an immi-
gration offi  cer, a public servant designated by the Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration (the Minister) to perform 
specifi c functions under the Act,113 including determining 
whether protection claimants are eligible to have their pro-
tection claim determined by the IRB’s Refugee Protection 
Division.114 A refugee claimant may be ineligible to have 
her protection claim determined by the RPD in several cir-
cumstances,115 including where she made a prior protection 
claim that was rejected by the IRB or determined to be in-
eligible or to have been withdrawn or abandoned, came dir-
ectly or indirectly to Canada from a designated “safe third 
country,” or was found inadmissible on grounds of security, 
violating human or international rights, serious criminality, 
or organized criminality. Claimants must provide the offi  cer 
with information needed to establish their identity, back-
ground, how they arrived in Canada, and why they are seek-
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ing refugee protection,116 and must prove they are eligible.117 
Eligible claimants complete a Personal Information Form118 
designed to elicit the information required by the RPD to 
make a refugee determination decision.119 Ineligible claim-
ants are subject to removal from Canada but may apply to the 
Minister for protection under a pre-removal risk assessment 
(PRRA) process120 and, if successful, receive refugee protec-
tion or, at least, a temporary stay of their removal orders.121 
Th ey may also seek leave to apply for judicial review of their 
ineligibility decision in the Federal Court.
Claimants found to be ineligible because they came 
to Canada from a country designated as a safe country by 
the regulations do not receive a PRRA.122 On December 5, 
2002, Canada and the United States concluded a Safe Th ird 
Country Agreement123 providing for the return to the United 
States of persons seeking refugee protection and arriving in 
Canada from the United States unless they can establish that 
an exception to the Agreement applies.124 Refugee claimants 
are excepted from return if they can establish the presence in 
Canada of a relative with legal status,125 are unaccompanied 
minors,126 or present claims that Canadian authorities, in 
their discretion, decide to examine where they determine it 
is in the public interest to do so.127
In Canada, eligibility decisions under the Safe Th ird 
Country Agreement are carried out according to CIC guide-
lines by offi  cers employed by the CBSA. Claimants must satis-
fy authorities, on a balance of probabilities, of the existence 
of a family relationship with an appropriate anchor relative 
needed to qualify for an exemption.128 In most cases, claim-
ants found ineligible to make a refugee claim in Canada under 
the Agreement are removed the same day as they arrive at the 
port of entry.129 Claimants are entitled to an administrative 
review: the offi  cer who conducts the examination submits an 
inadmissibility report and eligibility recommendation to a 
diff erent offi  cer who reviews the information with the claim-
ant, gives the claimant a chance to respond and makes a fi nal 
decision on admissibility and eligibility.130
Th e Refugee Protection Division
Th e Refugee Protection Division of the IRB is the primary 
body responsible for refugee protection determination. Its 
full-time and part-time members,131 chosen by a seven-mem-
ber Selection Advisory Board chaired by the IRB Chair,132 
are appointed by the Governor-in-Council for a term not ex-
ceeding seven years and are eligible for reappointment.133 It 
has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions 
of law and fact in refugee protection determination proceed-
ings.134 RPD hearings are held in the claimant’s presence, 
typically before a single member.135 Each panel is assisted by 
an IRB refugee protection offi  cer (RPO) who reviews fi les to 
identify issues, conducts research, holds interviews, presents 
evidence, calls and questions witnesses, makes representa-
tions, and generally ensures a full and proper examination of 
a claim.136 RPOs and RPD members question the claimant 
to “fl ush out any weaknesses in the claimant’s case that might 
lead to a determination that the claimant is not a person in 
need of protection,”137 making the RPD hearing a relatively 
inquisitorial process. In contrast, the claimant’s representative 
seeks to establish that she is a person in need of protection. 
Th e Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 
may intervene to oppose the claim.138 Individual RPD panel 
members control the hearing procedure but generally follow 
IRB guidelines regarding the conduct of the hearing.139
A claimant’s refugee protection claim is accepted if she 
establishes that, on the balance of probabilities, she is a 
Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.140 
If the RPD rejects a claim, it delivers written reasons to the 
Minister and claimant,141 who is subject to removal from 
Canada. However, she may apply to the Minister for pro-
tection by requesting a PRRA, ask the Minister to allow her 
to remain in Canada on humanitarian and compassionate 
(H&C) grounds,142 and seek judicial review of the RPD’s 
negative decision.
Statutory appeals and other avenues of administrative 
review
Claimants may appeal a decision of the RPD to the Refugee 
Appeal Division (RAD) of the IRB on a question of law, fact, 
or mixed law and fact.143 Th e provisions implementing the 
RAD have not been proclaimed into force in the seven years 
since their enactment. Until they are, failed or ineligible refu-
gee protection claimants have two administrative “review” 
options: a pre-removal risk assessment and an application 
for a humanitarian and compassionate review of their case. 
Unlike a RAD appeal or judicial review, neither option allows 
the applicant to contest a negative RPD determination.
Persons in Canada subject to a removal order are gener-
ally eligible to apply for a PRRA.144 Notable exceptions in-
clude claimants found ineligible to make a protection claim 
because they arrived from a designated safe third country 
or, having been removed aft er their protection claim was 
declared ineligible, rejected, withdrawn, or abandoned, re-
turned to Canada within six months of their removal.145 Th e 
PRRA recognizes that events that occur in a failed claimant’s 
home country aft er her claim is rejected but before her re-
moval may put her at risk of persecution or cruel and un-
usual treatment and entitle her to protection. Accordingly, 
when arrangements have been made for their removal,146 eli-
gible persons are notifi ed that they may apply for a PRRA.147 
Protection claimants may only submit new evidence arising 
since the rejection of their claim by the RPD or evidence that 
was not reasonably available or that the claimant could not 
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reasonably have been expected to have presented at the time 
of the rejection.148 In a PRRA, a public servant employed by 
CIC decides, based on a written application, whether the ap-
plicant has established that she comes within the Convention 
refugee defi nition or is a person in need of protection.149 A 
successful applicant receives refugee protection just as if the 
RPD had granted it.150 Unsuccessful applicants may seek 
leave to apply for judicial review of the PRRA decision.
At any time, refugee protection claimants may apply to 
remain in Canada on humanitarian and compassionate 
grounds.151 Th e IRPA confers on the Minister the discre-
tion to grant any non-citizen permanent resident status or an 
exemption from any applicable statutory requirement if this 
is justifi ed by public policy considerations or by humanitar-
ian and compassionate considerations relating to the non-
citizen, taking into account the best interests of a directly 
aff ected child. CIC has structured this ministerial discre-
tion by requiring offi  cers to take into account very detailed 
guidelines.152 Essentially, a H&C applicant must show that 
requiring her to apply for permanent residence from outside 
of Canada would result in unusual and undeserved or dis-
proportionate hardship.153 She may also claim that her re-
moval from Canada would subject her personally to a risk to 
her life or security of the person.154 In such a case, the H&C 
offi  cer assesses all “non-risk” factors, approves the applica-
tion if these are suffi  cient, and, if not, forwards it to a PRRA 
offi  cer for a risk opinion which the H&C offi  cer considers in 
accepting or rejecting the application.155 H&C applications 
are typically “heard” on the papers. Filing an H&C applica-
tion does not stay a removal order. Claimants may seek leave 
to apply for judicial review of unfavourable H&C decisions.
Review by the Federal Court of Canada
A refugee protection claimant may contest an unfavourable 
eligibility decision, refugee protection decision, PRRA, or 
H&C decision by applying to the Federal Court in writing, 
within fi ft een days of the decision, for leave to apply for ju-
dicial review.156 Leave applications are determined “with-
out delay and in a summary way,”157 and granted only if the 
application discloses a fairly arguable case for the relief re-
quested.158 Judges should not review the merits of the ap-
plication for judicial review save to the extent required to 
deal with the leave application,159 and should not grant leave 
lightly since the leave stage is meant to screen out frivolous 
applications.160 Judges provide no written reasons in sup-
port of leave decisions,161 which are not subject to appeal.162 
Between 2004 and 2007, the proportion of successful appli-
cations for leave and judicial review of refugee protection de-
cisions ranged from 12 to 18 per cent.163
Judicial review is restricted to narrow grounds of review 
set out in the Federal Court Act.164 On successful applica-
tions, the Court usually quashes the impugned decision and 
remits the protection claim to the decision maker for a deter-
mination in accordance with its directions.165 Unsuccessful 
applicants may appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal only if 
the trial judge hearing the judicial review application agrees 
to certify that “a serious question of general importance is 
involved.”166 Trial judges certify questions for appeal in ex-
ceptional circumstances, where the question is both serious 
and of general importance, would be determinative of the 
appeal,167 transcends the interests of the immediate parties, 
and contemplates issues of “broad signifi cance and general 
application.”168 Th e decision not to certify a question cannot 
be appealed. Before the Court of Appeal, the appellant may 
advance grounds of appeal in addition to those pleaded in 
the certifi ed question.169
To determine the intensity with which it should review 
determinations of the RPD or of a PRRA or H&C offi  cer, 
the Federal Court applies a “standard of review” analysis 
which requires it to consider whether the question raised by 
the legislative provision at issue in the particular case was 
intended by Parliament to be determined exclusively by the 
administrative decision maker. Th e standard of review de-
pends on the presence of a privative clause in the decision 
maker’s enabling statute, whether the decision maker has 
special expertise relative to courts in the matter under re-
view, the purpose of the statutory provision at issue and the 
nature of the question to be decided (i.e., fact, law, mixed fact 
and law).170 Until recently,171 there were three possible stan-
dards of review.172 Under the “correctness” standard, courts 
owe no deference to a decision-maker’s interpretations or 
determinations. In contrast, under the “patent unreason-
ableness” standard, courts deferred to a tribunal’s determina-
tions made in the heartland of its expertise unless these were 
clearly irrational. Under the intermediate “reasonableness” 
standard, courts intervene if the decision-maker’s decision is 
“not supported by any reasons that stand up to a somewhat 
probing examination.”173 Th e Supreme Court of Canada has 
now collapsed the patent unreasonableness and reasonable-
ness standards into a single form of reasonableness review. 
However, this has not “pave[d] the way for a more intrusive 
review by the courts.”174 A deferential reasonableness stan-
dard will usually “apply automatically” where courts review 
questions of fact, discretion, or policy, or questions where 
legal and factual issues are intertwined.175
Th e Federal Court reviews RPD decisions on questions of 
law, including the interpretation of the Refugee Convention, 
on an exacting correctness standard,176 largely because the 
RPD enjoys no relative expertise in interpreting general legal 
principles that defi ne basic human rights guarantees. In con-
trast, it accords the highest degree of deference to the RPD’s 
determination of a claimant’s credibility or of the plausibility 
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of her evidence, which it judges to be “at the heartland of 
the discretion of triers of fact,”177 and to the RPD’s apprecia-
tion and weighing of the evidence adduced before it.178 Th e 
Federal Court has stated that it would not set aside fi ndings 
of fact unless they were patently unreasonable. Although the 
appropriate standard is now reasonableness, the Court still 
approaches the judicial review of RPD decisions with con-
siderable deference.179 It also reviews PRRA decisions on a 
deferential standard of reasonableness, since they are based 
on an appreciation of new evidence and credibility,180 and 
applies the same standard of review to the discretionary and 
fact-intensive H&C decisions.181
Based on this brief description of Canada’s refugee status 
determination system, the next section assesses whether 
refugee protection decision making in Canada conforms to 
the international norm of tribunal independence.
Th e Independence of Canadian Refugee Protection 
Adjudicators
As discussed above, to meet international norms of in-
dependence, disputes involving fundamental human rights 
that are adjudicated at fi rst instance by a non-independent 
decision maker182 must be subject to more intense review 
by an independent court or administrative tribunal with suf-
fi cient jurisdiction over the merits—legal and factual—of 
the dispute. In Canada, judicial review of refugee protection 
decisions is available, with leave, in the Federal Court—an 
independent tribunal. However, the small proportion of 
refugee protection claimants who obtain leave to apply for ju-
dicial review are heard by a court that may not have suffi  cient 
jurisdiction over the merits of refugee protection decisions 
because it conducts a very deferential review of the factual 
determinations of fi rst instance refugee protection decision 
makers, including the RPD and PRRA offi  cers, applying def-
erential standards of “no evidence,” unreasonableness or ir-
rationality.183 Considering the fundamental rights at stake in 
refugee protection decisions, such deferential judicial review, 
especially of factual fi ndings, may not be intense enough to 
satisfy international standards, particularly as elaborated by 
the European Court in Bryan and by the House of Lords in 
Alconbury and Begum. Consequently, the right of refugee 
protection claimants to a hearing of their claim by an in-
dependent tribunal will be respected only if the fi rst instance 
decision maker or any merits review tribunal meets the re-
quirements of tribunal independence.
Depending on the circumstances under which a protection 
claim is brought in Canada, it may be considered at fi rst in-
stance by the RPD, a PRRA offi  cer, or an immigration offi  cer. 
Th e RPD likely meets international norms of independence. 
However, there exist serious concerns about the independ-
ence of offi  cers charged with pre-removal risk assessments of 
ineligible protection claimants, and border services offi  cers 
responsible for deciding whether claimants arriving via the 
United States are eligible for a protection hearing in Canada 
under the safe third country agreement are probably not suf-
fi ciently independent. Th ese concerns have also been voiced 
by international treaty bodies.184
Protection Decisions by the Refugee Protection Division
Th e RPD would probably be recognized as an independent 
tribunal under international law. Established by the IRPA, 
it has full jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions 
of law and fact in refugee protection proceedings. Its mem-
bers benefi t from strong guarantees of security of tenure. 
Appointed for relatively lengthy fi xed terms, they are virtually 
irremovable.185 Th ey enjoy fi nancial security, receiving a re-
muneration fi xed by the Governor-in-Council.186 Th e IRPA 
vests administrative control in the IRB Chair, who is empow-
ered to supervise and direct IRB staff , assign administrative 
duties to members, apportion work among members, and 
guide members’ decision making by issuing written guide-
lines and identifying specifi c IRB decisions as jurisprudential 
guides.187 Th ough further research is needed to assess the 
impact of recent controversial changes to the appointment 
process for RPD members,188 an RPD proceeding likely con-
stitutes a hearing before an independent tribunal.189
Protection Decisions by PRRA offi  cers
Some refugee protection claims are ineligible for a hearing by 
the RPD and are considered on the merits in a pre-removal 
risk assessment by a PRRA offi  cer. PRRA offi  cers are public 
servants employed by CIC. Th eir status and the signifi cant 
impact of their decisions on non-citizens’ lives raise con-
cerns about whether they are suffi  ciently independent from 
the executive. Th e Federal Court of Appeal discussed similar 
concerns under earlier immigration legislation in Mohammad 
v. Canada (M.E.I.).190 Mohammad claimed that immigration 
adjudicators who conducted deportation inquiries lacked the 
institutional independence required by common law natural 
justice and section 7 of the Charter. Adjudicators were ordin-
ary public servants employed by the Canada Employment 
and Immigration Commission (CEIC). Along with case pre-
senting offi  cers, who were part of the Enforcement Branch, 
they fell under the same associate deputy minister and 
were advised by the same Legal Services Branch. Th ey were 
sometimes seconded to enforcement positions and case pre-
senting offi  cers were sometimes assigned to be adjudicators. 
Th e motions judge held that the relatively low independence 
level of adjudicators was acceptable because their decisions 
could be appealed to the more independent Immigration 
Appeals Tribunal,191 and from there to the Federal Court 
of Appeal.192 Th e Court of Appeal agreed that adjudicators 
Volume 25 Refuge Number 2
90
Refuge25-2.indd   90 5/25/10   5:51:43 PM
had suffi  cient institutional independence having regard to 
the statutory scheme, the regulations, administrative direc-
tives, job descriptions, and the sworn testimony of a former 
adjudicator regarding the operation of the adjudication sys-
tem.193 It noted that adjudicators and case presenting offi  -
cers de facto operated within separate divisions of CEIC—the 
Adjudication Directorate and the Enforcement Branch—and 
did not report to a common superior. Seconding staff  from 
one division to the other did not undermine this institution-
al separation. With appropriate safeguards, which included 
placing adjudicators within a directorate autonomous from 
enforcement staff , ensuring that they had recourse to public 
service grievance procedures, specifying in administrative 
directives and job descriptions that their independence had 
to be respected, and requiring them to swear an oath to faith-
fully and honestly fulfi l their duties as public servants, the 
adjudication of immigration matters by public servants com-
plied with the right to be heard by an independent tribunal.
While Mohammad indicates that PRRA offi  cers may be 
independent under Canadian law, there are signs that this de-
cision no longer refl ects Canadian or international standards 
of independence. Marked by internal inconsistencies,194 the 
judgment was largely displaced by 1993 amendments to the 
Immigration Act that created an Adjudication Division with-
in the IRB,195 provided for the appointment of adjudicators 
under the Public Service Employment Act, and ensured that 
they reported to the IRB Chair, not the Minister.196 Th e 
Federal Court of Appeal questioned Mohammad’s validity in 
Ahumada v. Canada (M.C.I.), where it held that the second-
ment of an enforcement offi  cer to the Convention Refugee 
Determination Division (CRDD) of the IRB raised a reason-
able apprehension of bias, because she might “be mindful” 
of how her colleagues in CIC’s enforcement branch would 
view her decisions and their eff ect on her career at CIC.197 
Mohammad, it held, predated several Supreme Court cases 
in which statutory schemes of administrative adjudication 
had been impugned for failing to ensure institutional in-
dependence and may not have been decided the same way 
today “as it was nearly 15 years ago.”198 Th e Court warned 
that “offi  cials responsible for enforcing the law … almost 
inevitably tend to view matters from an enforcement per-
spective” and observed that in order to avoid the danger 
of enforcement-minded adjudication, the Immigration Act 
“entrusts adjudicative functions to a tribunal that is in-
dependent of, and separate from, the agency responsible 
for enforcement.”199 Even aft er the 1993 amendments, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights expressed 
concern over the lower level of independence enjoyed by 
adjudicators, and the Adjudication Division’s enforcement 
focus, given the grave impact of adjudicators’ decisions on 
protection claimants.200
Unsuccessful PRRA applicants have claimed that PRRA 
offi  cers lack institutional independence and that their de-
terminations therefore breach common law procedural fair-
ness or the principles of fundamental justice under section 
7 of the Charter.201 Many such claims were fi led following a 
short-lived 2003 transfer of PRRA offi  cers along with those 
portions of CIC offi  ces in Canada that dealt with enforce-
ment to the newly created CBSA, reporting to the Minister 
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP).202 Th e 
government’s decision to group PRRAs with enforcement 
functions including removals, detention and investigation 
raised the eyebrows of refugee advocates, who questioned 
whether the CBSA, whose primary mandate was enforce-
ment and border control, could credibly protect refugees.203 
Within ten months, the government had returned the PRRA 
function to CIC because it was “more closely aligned with 
the protection aspect of CIC’s mandate.”204 Viewed charit-
ably, the transfer of PRRAs to the CBSA was simply a mis-
take. It could also signal that the Canadian government con-
sidered PRRAs to be part of the enforcement and removal 
process, and cast a shadow over the independence of PRRA 
offi  cers before December 2003, when they reported to a CIC 
whose responsibilities included enforcement,205 and when 
they subsequently reported to the CBSA, an enforcement 
and intelligence agency. Conversely, their current placement 
within a CIC shorn of some of its enforcement functions may 
enhance their institutional independence.
In Say v. Canada,206 the Federal Court rejected the claim 
that PRRA offi  cers, when they worked within the CBSA, 
were “supervised and controlled by offi  cials whose interest it 
is to remove the people whose cases they are assessing” and 
thus lacked institutional independence.207 In response to 
this claim, the federal government argued that it deliberately 
safeguarded PRRA offi  cers’ independence by physically and 
operationally insulating them from immigration enforce-
ment functions and by training them about the importance 
of independence.208 Removal offi  cers from the CBSA’s en-
forcement unit, who provide removal-ready individuals with 
PRRA applications, must coordinate their eff orts with the 
PRRA units to ensure that individual fi les fl ow to the PRRA 
unit for a risk assessment and back to the CBSA for removal 
arrangements, depending on the outcome of the assessment. 
To allow this interaction without jeopardizing the independ-
ence of the PRRA offi  cers,209 CIC entrusted coordination 
functions to “PRRA Coordinators” who act as a “fi rewall” 
between the PRRA offi  cers and the enforcement unit. PRRA 
Coordinators do not conduct risk assessments but assign 
applications to individual offi  cers for decision, hire PRRA 
offi  cers, and evaluate their job performance based on the 
quality of their written decisions and on their productivity. 
PRRA offi  cers are instructed not to have direct contact with 
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removals or enforcement personnel.210 Th ey may seek guid-
ance and policy advice regarding their substantive decision-
making duties from the National PRRA Policy Unit in CIC’s 
Refugees Branch.211 Th is institutional separation between 
PRRA offi  cers and enforcement personnel is reinforced by 
the practice of housing PRRA units in physically separate of-
fi ces212 and providing them with dedicated administrative 
support.213 Together with the fact that PRRA Coordinators, 
not the enforcement unit, assign fi les to individual offi  cers, 
these factors may establish a relatively high degree of admin-
istrative control.214 Moreover, the government argued, PRRA 
offi  cers enjoy suffi  cient security of tenure and remuneration 
to guarantee their independence because most hold perma-
nent positions within the public service.215 Finally, they re-
ceive training on administrative law and the importance of 
independence.216 In Say, the Federal Court found the gov-
ernment’s arguments convincing. It concluded that there 
would not be a reasonable apprehension of bias, in the mind 
of a fully informed person, in a substantial number of cases, 
because “there was a conscious eff ort to insulate the PRRA 
Program from the enforcement and removal functions of the 
CBSA.”217
Since, as the federal government concedes, the requisite 
level of independence depends in part on the interests at 
stake in the decision-making process,218 it is noteworthy 
that under the former Immigration Act, failed refugee claim-
ants could obtain additional hearings before the CRDD 
if they re-entered Canada more than six months aft er the 
last determination. Under the IRPA, claimants are entitled 
to only one hearing before the RPD, but to multiple PRRA 
hearings following the RPD’s dismissal of their claim. PRRA 
offi  cers have assumed a role once played by an independ-
ent tribunal; they make risk determinations of a similar 
nature and apply the same defi nition of “person in need 
of protection.” A positive PRRA decision earns claimants 
protection similar to that granted by the RPD to successful 
refugee claimants. Based strictly on the nature of the indi-
vidual interests at stake, then, PRRA offi  cers should meet 
the same independence standards as RPD members. Th ey 
do not. Whether the measures adopted by CIC to shield 
them from enforcement infl uence suffi  ce to guarantee their 
independence is debatable. Although the unionized regime 
governing the employment of most public servants, includ-
ing the grievance process, does provide some measure of 
employment security, these protections appear to fall short 
of standards recognized by the European Court.219 Public 
servants are vulnerable to the infl uence of potentially career-
limiting evaluations.220 Th ey could be expected, as noted in 
Ahumada, to be “mindful” of the impact of their decisions 
on their advancement prospects in government, including 
departments linked to immigration enforcement.
In Say, the Federal Court held that in assessing whether 
the grounds for the perception of a lack of institutional in-
dependence are “substantial” enough, it would show sub-
stantial deference to government decisions “that relate to 
appropriate organization of public servants devoted to the 
administration of the vast range of responsibilities of the 
Government of Canada.”221 Th e court’s deferential posture 
in assessing the institutional independence of PRRA offi  cers 
is inappropriate. PRRA offi  cers are public servants, but they 
have extraordinary responsibilities. Th ey make decisions 
that engage refugee protection claimants’ constitutionally 
protected life and security of the person interests. Th eir in-
stitutional independence should be re-evaluated in light of 
this reality.222
Eligibility Determinations by Immigration Offi  cers
Immigration offi  cers determine whether refugee protection 
claimants are eligible to have their protection claims heard by 
the RPD. At ports of entry, they are public servants employed 
by the CBSA, an agency primarily concerned with immigra-
tion law enforcement. Inland, they are public servants em-
ployed by CIC. Without additional guarantees, these offi  cers 
cannot be considered independent from the executive. In 
most circumstances, their lack of independence does not ne-
cessarily result in a violation of protection claimants’ right 
to have their claims assessed by an independent tribunal, 
since eligibility determinations are usually followed by a 
risk assessment by a PRRA offi  cer, who may be independ-
ent. Claimants found to be ineligible because they came to 
Canada from a country designated as a safe country do not 
receive a PRRA.223 In 2007, the Federal Court determined 
that returning asylum seekers to the United States under the 
Safe Th ird Country Agreement infringed their fundamen-
tal Charter rights because many aspects of the US refugee 
status determination system do not live up to international 
norms.224 If this were indeed the case, because ineligible 
claimants are not entitled to a PRRA, eligibility determina-
tions engage their life and security of the person interests 
and must conform to the principles of fundamental justice. 
Fundamental justice and international norms would require 
that independent and impartial decision makers aff ord the 
claimants a hearing and assess whether their life or freedom 
would be threatened upon their return to the United States. 
Th e offi  cers who interview claimants at the border, make 
eligibility decisions and review their colleagues’ decisions 
are employed by the CBSA, an agency tasked with the en-
forcement of Canada’s immigration laws. Th ey do not make 
decisions following the quasi-judicial process and with the 
accompanying safeguards contemplated by the European 
Court in Bryan. Although their decisions are open to judicial 
review, the proceedings as a whole would likely not consti-
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tute a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal, 
particularly in light of the fundamental nature of the inter-
ests at stake.225
Critiques of the Canadian System by Treaty Bodies
Regional and international treaty bodies have criticized 
Canada’s decision to entrust pre-removal risk assessment 
and eligibility decisions to government offi  cials. In 2000, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported 
on whether Canada’s refugee determination process com-
ported with its Inter-American human rights obligations. It 
interpreted the right to seek asylum in article XXVII of the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man226 
as requiring that each refugee claimant be “accorded the 
minimum guarantees necessary to eff ectively state his or her 
claim,”227 and voiced concern that non-independent immi-
gration offi  cials made eligibility and admissibility decisions:
Senior immigration offi  cers are employees of … [CIC]. 
Members of the Adjudication Division, while part of the IRB, 
are also public servants rather than appointed decision-makers. 
Further, while the CRDD has specialized expertise, procedures 
and resources for determining refugee claims, the Adjudication 
Division deals in broader terms and through adversarial pro-
cedures with who is admissible or removable from Canada, and 
with detention reviews. Because the mandate of the Adjudication 
Division is more heavily directed toward control issues and law-
enforcement, it is inherently less able to properly balance the 
public and individual interests involved.228
It proposed that the independent CRDD decide eligibility 
and admissibility:
[T]he nature of the rights potentially at issue—for example, to 
life and to be free from torture—requires the strictest adherence 
to all applicable safeguards. Th ose safeguards include the right to 
have one’s eligibility to enter the process decided by a competent, 
independent and impartial decision-maker, through a process 
which is fair and transparent.229
In its Concluding Observations on Canada’s third periodic 
report regarding its implementation of its obligations under 
the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment,230 and 
in particular the article 3(1) prohibition against refoulement 
to torture, the Committee Against Torture (CAT) expressed 
concerns that “the alleged lack of independence of decision-
makers,” among other factors, could hinder the eff ectiveness 
of risk assessments in protecting claimants’ rights under the 
CAT.231 Acknowledging Canada’s assurances that the PRRA 
process proposed under the forthcoming IRPA would have 
an application broader than that of the old process, the 
Committee encouraged Canada “to ensure that IRPA per-
mitted in-depth examination of claims by an independent en-
tity …”232 In its Concluding Observations on Canada’s fourth 
and fi ft h periodic reports, the Committee recommended 
that Canada “provide for judicial review of the merits rather 
than merely the reasonableness” of decisions to expel non-
citizens where article 3(1) CAT is engaged.233 It reiterated 
these concerns in its views on the petition of Enrique Falcon 
Ríos, a Mexican citizen who claimed to have been tortured by 
Mexican soldiers who suspected that he and his family were 
supporters of the Zapatista national liberation movement.234 
Th e CRDD dismissed his refugee claim, fi nding that his ac-
count of the events leading to his fl ight from Mexico was not 
credible due in part to signifi cant “gaps” in his testimony.235 
Th e Federal Court dismissed Ríos’s application for judicial 
review, fi nding no error that would justify its intervention. 
Aft er he was refused permission to remain in Canada on hu-
manitarian and compassionate grounds, he fi led a petition 
arguing that he would be tortured if returned to Mexico. 
Canada argued that the petition was inadmissible because 
Ríos had not exhausted domestic remedies likely to bring ef-
fective relief, including judicial review of the negative H&C 
decision and a PRRA. Th e Committee disagreed, fi nding that 
for Ríos, neither an H&C application nor a PRRA would ef-
fectively protect his rights under the CAT. Humanitarian and 
compassionate assistance, if granted, was on a purely discre-
tionary basis,236 and there were signifi cant concerns about 
how H&C offi  cers’ lack of independence could jeopardize 
the eff ectiveness of H&C applications as a remedy against 
refoulement.237 A PRRA would not have been eff ective, since 
the PRRA offi  cer could only have considered fresh evidence 
arising aft er the initial CRDD decision and Ríos was really 
seeking a rehearing of his case.238 Th e Committee allowed 
the petition.239 In subsequent petitions brought before the 
Committee, Canada has claimed that Ríos was wrongly de-
cided and has argued, relying on Say, that the PRRA process 
is an eff ective remedy because PRRA offi  cers are specially 
trained to consider provisions of the Canadian Charter and 
international human rights treaties and are independent and 
impartial, and because it is “governed by statutory criteria for 
protection, conducted pursuant to a highly regulated process 
and in accordance with extensive and detailed guidelines” 
and is subject to judicial review.240 Th e Committee appears 
to have backed down from its critical position in Ríos, fi nd-
ing in several cases that, on their specifi c facts, the PRRA 
process combined with judicial review had constituted an ef-
fective remedy.241
In sum, because of the Federal Court’s limited jurisdiction 
in judicial review proceedings over the merits of refugee pro-
tection claims, international norms of independence would 
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require administrative decision makers who make fi nal deci-
sions on the merits of protection claims to be independent. 
While the RPD is likely independent, the status of PRRA of-
fi cers as civil servants within CIC raises some concerns about 
their independence. Protection claimants who can establish 
that they will likely be deprived of a fair hearing of their 
claims and exposed to refoulement if returned to the United 
States under the Safe Th ird Country Agreement are entitled 
under international norms to a hearing of their claim before 
an independent tribunal. Th e CBSA offi  cers responsible for 
determining their eligibility to a hearing before the RPD are 
part of Canada’s border control machinery and are not suf-
fi ciently independent. Th e concerns over the independence 
of PRRA offi  cers and immigration offi  cers are echoed in 
the reports and jurisprudence of regional and international 
treaty bodies. Because judicial review of their decisions is 
not available as of right and since, in the small proportion of 
cases where leave is granted, reviewing courts apply deferen-
tial standards of review on questions of fact and credibility, 
refugee protection decision making by immigration offi  cers 
and PRRA offi  cers may not meet international standards of 
independence.
Conclusion
I have argued, based on a review of the jurisprudence de-
veloped under the ICCPR and ECHR, that article 14 of the 
ICCPR guarantees refugee protection claimants a hearing of 
their protection claims before an independent tribunal with 
suffi  cient jurisdiction over the merits of these claims. In cer-
tain cases, the administrative decision makers responsible 
for the adjudication of refugee protection claims in Canada 
are not suffi  ciently isolated from the infl uence of the execu-
tive arm of government responsible for the enforcement of 
ordinary immigration laws. Where, in these circumstances, 
refugee protection claimants succeed in obtaining leave to 
apply for judicial review, the Federal Court’s deferential re-
view of questions of fact and credibility means that the Court 
does not have suffi  cient jurisdiction over the merits of pro-
tection claims as required by the international norm of tribu-
nal independence.
How should Canada’s Parliament and judiciary respond 
to such gaps between Canadian refugee protection laws and 
international human rights norms? In contemplating reforms 
to Canada’s refugee protection system, legislators should har-
monize it with international human rights norms and, at the 
very least, reject proposed changes that would widen the gap 
between domestic and international law. Canadian legislators 
showed openness to the positive infl uence of international hu-
man rights law when they inserted in the IRPA a requirement 
that its provisions be interpreted and applied in a manner 
that complies with international human rights instruments 
to which Canada is a signatory.242 If Canada’s Parliament 
fails to align Canada’s refugee protection system with inter-
national standards, then refugee protection claimants may 
have little choice but to ask domestic courts to address the 
existing gaps through constitutional challenges. I have argued 
elsewhere243 that Canadian courts should recognize that hu-
man rights norms expressed in ratifi ed international treaties 
are prima facie evidence of the existence of similar or identical 
fundamental norms in Canadian law, and that they are there-
fore bound to interpret the Charter (including the content of 
fundamental justice—the source of refugee protection claim-
ants’ entrenched constitutional procedural and institutional 
rights) in conformity with these treaty norms, absent evi-
dence that they are not universal in nature or lack resonance 
with Canadian legal values. At present, however, the Supreme 
Court has not clearly held that it is under a legal duty to in-
terpret the Charter in conformity with Canada’s international 
human rights obligations—only that there exists a “rule of ju-
dicial policy” that it should do so.244
Could refugee protection claimants persuade Canadian 
courts to invalidate Canada’s refugee protection laws be-
cause they confl ict with principles of fundamental justice 
shaped by Canada’s international human rights obligations, 
including the international norm of tribunal independence? 
Clearly, signifi cant obstacles must be overcome before such 
challenges could succeed. But at the very least, international 
human rights norms, forged from a broad consensus among 
disparate nations, provide an important measuring rod with 
which to assess the scope and content of procedural and in-
stitutional safeguards, including tribunal independence, in 
domestic refugee protection systems. Gaps between domes-
tic protections and international standards need to be iden-
tifi ed and, if possible, justifi ed. Th e analytical framework I 
have developed here is a fi rst step in this larger project.
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